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Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Women with Disabilities
Abstract
This article examines the issue of mandatory minimum sentencing from the unique perspective of
women with disabilities. Concerns about the discriminatory application of mandatory minimum
sentences are outlined and analyzed from a gendered disability perspective, as are concerns about the
devaluation of the lives of persons with disabilities through the support of reduced sentences for those
convicted of murdering persons with disabilities. This examination makes it clear that the different
concerns of women with disabilities are difficult to reconcile, as they mandate contradictory positions
with respect to the possible abolition of the sentencing practice. The challenges inherent in the
development of a position that addresses all of the concerns of women with disabilities relating to the
practice of mandatory minimum sentencing, and its possible abolition, are analyzed. The author
concludes that if the practice of mandatory minimum sentencing is abolished, it must be replaced with a
sentencing mechanism designed to ensure that sentencing discretion is exercised in accordance with
Charter values, in order to protect the equality rights of all persons, including women with disabilities.
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MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
AND WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES"
BY FIONA SW SON'
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THE CHALLENGE OF MANDATORY MINIMA FOR
WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES

The issue of mandatory minimum sentences is important to ablebodied women, persons with disabilities, and women with disabilities;
however, their respective interests on this issue are derived from different
social, historical, and political perspectives.' The main concern for ablebodied feminist advocacy groups relating to the issue of mandatory
minimum sentences is its ineffectiveness and discriminatory application.2
Most recently, non-disabled feminist advocacy groups have advocated for
the abolition of mandatory minimum sentences, in conjunction with law
reform initiatives calling for the abolition of the defence of provocation.3
Persons with disabilities approach the issue of mandatory minima primarily
from the experience associated with the Latimer4 case, and place a priority
on the protection of the social and legal value of the lives of persons with
disabilities. Women with disabilities have a unique perspective on the issue

I There are currently twenty-nine offences in the CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 that carry
a mandatory minimum penalty. The discussion in this article is focused primarily on the mandatory
minimum penalty relating to convictions for first and second-degree murder.
2 Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, Response to the Department of Justice re:
Reforming CriminalCode Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and Defence of Property (Ottawa: CAEFS,
1999) [hereinafter CAEFS Reform Paper];National Association of Women and the Law, Stop Excusing
Violence Against Women: NAWi'S Position Paper on the Defence of Provocation (Ottawa: National
Association of Women and the Law, 2000) [hereinafter NAWI. Provocation Paper]; Women's Legal
Education and Action Fund, A Feminist Perspective on Provocation in Criminal Law: FurtherSteps
Towards the Implementation of EqualityRights in CriminalLaw(Toronto: LEAF, 2000) [hereinafterLEAF
Reform Paper].
3 Ibid.
4 R. v. Latimer, [200111 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Latimerl.
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of mandatory minimum sentencing and there is no easy way for them to
reconcile the different concerns over mandatory minimum sentencing that
mandate contradictory positions with respect to the possible abolition of
the sentencing practice.'
Women with disabilities share the different equality-based concerns
of both able-bodied feminists and persons with disabilities relating to
mandatory minimum sentencing. These different concerns relate to the
repercussions of mandatory minimum sentencing for those members of
disadvantaged groups who are likely to be charged with murder, and for
persons with disabilities who are potential murder victims. Women with
disabilities face a difficult challenge as they seek to balance competing
concerns in their development of a position on the possible abolition of
mandatory minimum sentences. In order to ensure that their rights within
this context are protected and respected, the challenges facing women with
disabilities need to be made clear. An understanding of the unique
perspective of women with disabilities on the issue of mandatory minimum
sentencing is necessary in order to appreciate the reticence that they have
in supporting the unconditional abolition of mandatory minimum
sentencing, and their insistence on the need for protections against the
discriminatory exercise of judicial discretion in the sentencing context.
Women with disabilities are concerned with the practice of
mandatory minimum sentencing as both potential criminal defendants and
potential victims of murder. The imposition of increasingly repressive
sanctions, including mandatory minimum sentences, operates to augment
the systematic discrimination that is usually associated with the criminal
justice system. The fact that the criminal justice system operates primarily
to preserve state authority, usually to the disadvantage of vulnerable
minority groups, places women with disabilities at risk. Mandatory
minimum sentences contribute to the inequality that defines the criminal
justice system, and therefore women with disabilities are concerned vAth
the use of this sentencing practice and appreciate the need for its abolition.

5 The opinions expressed in this paper relating to 'omen with disabilities are based
upon my ow:an
experience as a woman with a physical disability, myvork as a member of Dicablcd Women's Nct%, orh
Canada's Equality Rights Committee (DAWvN Canada), and my own understanding of the pahitcal
consensus within the community of women with disabilities in Canada. The opinions exprc-sed do not
represent those of DAWN Canada, unless otherwise noted.
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However, women with disabilities are also concerned with the
devaluation of the lives of persons with disabilities that may occur through
the support of reduced sentences for those convicted of murdering persons
with disabilities. The discriminatory reasoning employed to justify the
murder of persons with disabilities, such as Tracy Latimer, is offensive, and
violates the equality rights of persons with disabilities. Justifying the murder
of persons with disabilities based upon the rationale that they live lives of
diminished value reinforces rationalizations for treating them prejudicially.
Women with disabilities are concerned that without the application of
mandatory minimum sentences, judicial discretion relating to sentencing
decisions would operate to the disadvantage of persons with disabilities as
discriminatory reasoning would be used to justify reduced sentences for
those convicted of murdering persons with disabilities.
The difficulty in reconciling these competing concerns represents
the primary challenge for women with disabilities as they attempt to
develop a position on the possible abolition of the practice of mandatory
minimum sentencing.
In this article I examine the various concerns of women with
disabilities relating to the issue of mandatory minimum sentences. The
concerns relating to the possible abolitiou of mandatory minimum
sentences in the context of the defence of provocation will be discussed.
The issue of mandatory minimum sentences in the context of the Latimer
case as it relates to women with disabilities will then be discussed. This
discussion will be followed by an examination of the challenges facing
women with disabilities in balancing the competing concerns associated
with mandatory minimum sentencing.
Through a consideration of the future of mandatory minimum
sentencing in the different contexts relevant to women with disabilities, the
conflicting options for reform, including the abolition of mandatory
minima, the maintenance of the status quo, or a variation of the status quo,
become apparent. It is difficult to conceive of a single position on
mandatory minimum sentencing that addresses all of the concerns
associated with the practice. The goal of this article is to identify the
challenges faced by women with disabilities as they attempt to address these
concerns, and as they work to ensure that they do not disappear from the
debate about mandatory minimum sentences.
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MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES AND THE
DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION

Most recently, able-bodied feminists have considered the issue of
mandatory minimum sentencing in the context of deliberations on the
defence of provocation. In 1998, the federal government introduced a law
reform initiative in consideration of reforming the CrimnalCode defences
of provocation, self-defence, and the defence of property. A wide range of
constituents were invited to respond to this initiative. At least three
national women's equality rights organizations, the Women's Legal
Education and Action Fund (LEAF), the Canadian Association of Elizabeth
Fry Societies (cAEFs), and the National Association of Women and the
Law (NAWL) developed positions on recommendations for law reform in
response to this initiative.6 Feminists represented by these organizations
used this opportunity to develop formal positions on the defence of
provocation, currently enshrined in section 232 of the CriminalCode, and
the related issue of mandatory minimum sentencing.
The defence of provocation is a partial defence to a conviction of
murder. If applied successfully, it will reduce a conviction of murder to
manslaughter. The relevant sections of the CriminalCode read:
232(1)

Culpable homicide that othervase would be murder may be reduced to
manslaughter if the person who commitcd it did so in the heat of pas ,on caua-2d
by sudden provocation.

(2)

A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to depne
an ordinary person of the poer of self-control isprowc ation for the purpeZs of
this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for
his passion to cool.

(3)

For the purposes of this section. the questions
(a)

whether a particular %rongful act or insult amounted to proeaatton,
and

(b)

vhether the accused v as depricd of the pa-..er of _elf-control by the
prowocation that he alleges he received,

are questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to hae giwen pro ocatton to another by
doing anything that he had a legal right to do, or by doing anything that the accused incited
him to do in order to provide the accused with an escuse for causing death or bojit harm
to any human being7

6 Supra note 2.
7 CrhninalCode, spra note 1,ss. 232(l)-(3).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 39, NOS. 2 & 3

With a reduction from murder to manslaughter, the accused avoids
the mandatory minimum sentences of life imprisonment with no eligibility
of parole for twenty-five years for first-degree murder, and no eligibility for
parole for ten years for second-degree murder.8
What is particularly offensive about the defence of provocation is
the sexist origins of the defence and the discriminatory way in which the
defence continues to be applied today. Originally, the defence was
introduced to partially excuse so-called crimes of passion wherein men
killed their spouses and were able to blame the spouse for having provoked
the murder by, for example, having committed adultery, or insulting the
accused so that his loss of self-control and anger was excused. 9 The defence
of provocation is based upon a model of the criminal law that excuses
sexual domination and endorses a husband's proprietary interest in his
wife."0 The effect of the successful application of this defence is to partially
condone a crime committed to avenge any violation of these historical male
prerogatives." As it represents a legal sanction to the exercise of violence
against women, the defence of provocation can be understood to violate the
security and equality rights of women. It is thus easy to understand the
support of feminists for the abolition of this defence.
In addition to concerns about sex discrimination, the defence of
provocation is also problematic from the perspective of an accused with a
cognitive or mental impairment. Pursuant to section 232(2) of the Criminal
Code, in determining whether a specific act or insult was sufficiently
provocative to cause the ordinary person to lose self-control, the test
applied to the analysis is an objective one. Because the analysis is grounded
in the perspective of the ordinary, reasonable person, there is the potential
that the defence may be rendered unavailable to a person with a cognitive

8 Ibid., ss. 235, 236, 745(a), 745(c).
9A. C6t, The Defence of Provocation and Domestic Femicide (LLM. Thesis, University
of
Montreal 1994) [unpublished] at 38, 41-42, 120.
10 Ibid. at 2, 84, 119.
11 Ibid. at 2.
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impairment. According to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v.
Hill2 the reasonable person in the provocation context has "a normal
temperament and level of self-control." 3 In Hill, Chief Justice Dickson, as
he then was, found that the goal of the objective test in the provocation
context was to deny the benefit of the defence to "an ill-tempered or
exceptionally excitable person."'"
Following a review of British jurisprudence dealingwith the defence
of provocation and the application of the objective standard, Mr. Dickson
concluded that the ordinary or reasonable person was one of "normal
temperament and average mental capacity."" 5 Based upon this
understanding of the ordinary person standard, persons with 'abnormal'
temperaments, with less than average mental capacities, or those who are
exceptionally excitable, such as persons who may have cognitive
impairments, maybe denied the benefit of the provocation defence because
the wrongful act or insult that triggered their loss of self-control may be
considered to have been sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of selfcontrol.
The effect of the alleged provocation would be considered
unreasonable. At the same time, the accused's cognitive impairment may
be such that the accused may be unable to successfully argue that she is not
criminally responsible for her actions due to mental disorder under section
16 of the Criminal Code. Such an outcome could be understood to
constitute a violation of the section 15 Charter rights of persons vth
disabilities, as the accused may be denied the equal benefit and protection
of the law because of a mental or cognitive disability. This fundamental flaw
with the defence of provocation gives women with disabilities an additional
reason to find fault with the defence and to support its abolition.
Because of the discriminatory nature of the defence of provocation,
many feminists support its abolition. However with the abolition of the
defence of provocation, one means of circumventing a possible mandatory

12 [19861 I S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Hill].
13

Ibid. at 331.

14 Ibid.at 324.

is Ibid. at 325.
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minimum sentence for murder would be lost. This possibility concerns
feminists because of the potential for mandatory minimum sentences to be
applied to the systemic disadvantage of women, members of racialized
communities, persons with disabilities, the poor, and lesbians and gays. 6
There is evidence supporting the proposition that prosecutors' exercise of
discretion with respect to level of charges, choices of summary or indictable
process, position on bail, and sentencing, evince patterns of systemic racism
against African-Canadian and 1Aboriginal
accused and in favour of accused
7
descent.
Caucasian
of
persons
Research conducted by both CAEFS and Judge Ratushny in her 1997
Self-Defence Review' demonstrates that most women charged with
homicide of allegedly violent mates forego the use of possible defences
available to them, such as self-defence and/or provocation, and simply
plead guilty to manslaughter. These women do this because of their
concern that their defence might fail, and that they would consequently be
convicted of murder and receive a mandatory sentence. 9 Offenders with
mental disabilities are disadvantaged by mandatory minimum sentences
because unless their condition amounts to a mental disorder that deprived
them entirely of their ability to distinguish right from wrong, pursuant to
section 16 of the CriminalCode,judges are required to ignore their reduced
capacities? 0
Because of these concerns about the discriminatory application of
mandatory minimum sentencing, and related concerns about the
ineffectiveness of mandatory minimum sentences, many feminists support
the abolition of the defence of provocation only in conjunction with the
abolition of mandatory minimum sentencing.2 t

16 CAEFS Reform Paper, supra note 2 at
9-14.
17 See NAWvL ProvocationPaper,supra note 2 at 39; cAEFS Reform
Paper, ibid.
18 L Ratushny, Self-Defence Review (Final Report) (Ottawa: Minister of

Justice, 1997).

19cAEFS Reform Paper, ibid.
at
20

1bid. at 13.

21 See supra note 2.

12.
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Women with disabilities understand and are critical of the
discriminatory nature of the defence of provocation, and appreciate the
arguments in support of its abolition. The defence of provocation
contributes to society's endorsement of violence against women. Women
with disabilities experience gender violence at a rate disproportionate to
that of any other group of women,' and therefore women with disabilities
generally support legal initiatives designed to eliminate violence against
women and advance their equality rights. Women vth disabilities
appreciate the unacceptable consequences of the discriminatory application
of mandatory minimum sentences, particularly as they may find themselves
especially vulnerable. However, it is difficult for women with disabilities to
agree that the defence of provocation should be abolished only in
conjunction with the abolition of mandatory minimum sentences. Their
concern about mandatory minimum sentences is grounded in their
experience of the Latimer case and the discriminatory effect of the
dehumanization of disabled murder victims in the sentencing process.
III. MANDATORY INIMUM SENTENCES IN THE L4TIMER
CONTEXT
While able-bodied feminists were developing positions on the
possible reform of the defence of provocation and the abolition of
mandatory minimum sentences, women with disabilities were dealing with
the issue of mandatory minimum sentences in the context of persons with
disabilities as potential victims of murder. Since the murder of Tracy
Latimer, a twelve-year old girl who lived with cerebral palsy, by her father
Robert Latimer in 1993, the security and equal treatment of persons with
disabilities as potential murder victims at the hands of frustrated caretakers
has been a prime concern for persons with disabilities. Robert Latimer
attempted to characterize the murder of his daughter as a "mercy killing"
that was committed out of love in order to end Tracy's pain.

22 2

ti,supra note 9 at 119.

23See D. Sobsey, "Patterns of Sexual Abuse and As.ault" (1991)9 Se;uahty and Dtsability 243
at 24849.
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Latimer's defence focused only on what Tracy could not do: she was
spoon fed, incontinent, unable to talk, cognitively impaired, and dependant
upon others to provide her care-all of which had nothing to do with
Tracy's alleged pain, and the avowed theory of Latimer's defence.' Latimer
attempted to dehumanize Tracy in order to justify his request for a
constitutional exemption to the application of the mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions of the CriminalCode. Latimer thereby attempted to
deny Tracy, as the victim of his crime, and other persons with disabilities as
potential victims of what Latimer portrayed as a 'mercy killing,' the equal
application and potential benefit of these sentencing provisions.
In November 1997 Latimer was convicted of second-degree murder
for a second time.' Because the first jury that tried Latimer had convicted
him of second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder, he was
charged with second-degree murder for the purposes of his second trial.
Following the recommendation advanced by the jury in the second Latimer
trial, the judge granted Latimer a constitutional exemption from the
application of the mandatory minimum sentence provisions. The second
trial judge sentenced Latimer to one year of imprisonment and one year on
probation, rather than the mandatory minimum sentence for second-degree
murder of life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for ten years.2
The Court of Appeal affirmed Latimer's conviction, but varied the
sentence, imposing the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment
without parole eligibility for ten years. Latimer appealed the Court of
Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. DAWN Canada
intervened before the Supreme Court of Canada to argue that the
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence in Latimer's case did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of section 12 of the

24 R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (DAwN Canada Coalition Factum at 5) [hereinafter Dawn
CanadaFactumI .

25 R. v. Latimer, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217. A second trial was necessary because of prosecutorial

interference with the jury selection process at the first trial.
26 R. v. Latimer (1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 326 [hereinafter Latimer 1997 TD.J.
27R. v. Latimer (1998), 172 Sask. R. 161.
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Charter.DAWN Canada argued in support of the protection of the equality
and security rights of persons with disabilities in the context of sentencing
considerations in which the victim is a person with a disability.
DAXVrN'S intervention in the Latimerappeal was not an intervention

in support of mandatory minimum sentencesper se, but an intervention in
support of the equal application of the mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions of the Criminal Code. What was particularly offensive about
Latimer's defence from a disability equality rights perspective was the use,
or abuse, of the murder victim's disability to justify an exemption from the
regulated sentencing practice. When an accused attempts to justify a
diminished sentence by dehumanizing and devaluing the life of a disabled
victim, the victim unwillingly assumes a central role in the sentencing
process. To support such arguments used to justify the murder of disabled
persons constitutes discrimination. Persons with disabilities are vilified as
a result of the accused's prejudicial treatment of the disabled victim in the
sentencing context, and if the accused is successful, murder victims with
disabilities are clearly treated differently than non-disabled murdervictims.
DAWN did not intervene in Latimer to advocate in support of an
increased role for the victim within the sentencing process. Traditionally,
criminal justice in Canada has been understood to involve a dispute
between only the state and the accused, with no direct involvement of the
victim. The role of the victim in the criminal sentencing process is an issue
that has generated some controversy and debate.: 3 However, women with
disabilities are concerned not with the role of the victim in the sentencing
process per se, but with the treatment of the victim in the sentencing
context. The primary concern relates to the violation of the equality rights
of victims with disabilities through the discriminatory exercise of the
sentencing process as it currently exists. There is also concern about the
possibility of future equality rights violations resulting from sentencing
reform that may not provide for recognition of the vulnerability of
disadvantaged persons.

2

8 See DR. Lanctot,"The Role of the Victim in Sentencing" in Nattional Scminaron Senteicing

(Edmonton: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 1935); W, N. Renke, -Flapp rs to
Rappers: Criminal Law in 1921 and 1996" (1996) 35 Alta. L Rev. 'V; 1.Waller, -The Role of the
Victim in Sentencing and Related Processes" (Ottavwa: Department of Justice Canada, 19S),
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The discrimination inherent in sentencing arguments that
dehumanize a disabled victim are offensive because such arguments lead
to the denial of equal treatment under the law for the victim if they are
successful. However such arguments are also problematic because they
reinforce circular reasoning. Persons with disabilities are devalued by
society because of the differences associated with their physical and/or
mental impairment, subjected to discrimination and oppression, and then,
based upon their defining differences, the discrimination that they
experience is considered justified. The perception that disabled persons
lead lives of diminished value reinforces rationalizations for treating them
prejudicially.29 The effectiveness of the accused's dehumanization of
persons with disabilities is demonstrated by the trial judge's finding in
Latimer that Tracy had been "put to sleep"3" by her father-a euphemism
usually reserved for animals. The perpetuation of this kind of
discriminatory opinion about persons with disabilities is a result of the
primacy placed on "normalcy" by societt-a primacy that Latimer
assumed and the trial judge endorsed through the devaluation of Tracy as
a person outside of the norm.
Another dimension of the disability equality rights argument in
Latimerrelates to the legislated purpose of sentencing provisions as found
in section 718 of the CriminalCode. According to the CriminalCode, one
objective of sentencing is, under section 718(e), "to provide reparations for
harm done to the victims or to the community," and, under section 718(f),
"to promote ... acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the
community." There is some debate about the utility of section 718 of the
Criminal Code as it incorporates elements of both utilitarian and
retributivist sentencing traditions. a2 The legislation mandates judges to

29

M. Oliver, "Theoriesof Disability in Health Practice and Research" (1998) 317 British Medical
Journal 1446.
30 Latimer 1997 T.D., supra note 26 at 342.
31 L.J. Davis, "Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, the Novel, and the Invention
of the
Disabled Body in the Nineteenth Century" in LJ.Davis, ed., The Disability Studies Reader (New York:
Routledge, 1997) 9.
32 J.V. Roberts
& A. Von Hirsh, "Legislating the Purpose and Principles of Sentencing" in J.V.
Roberts & D.P. Cole, eds., Making Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 48
at 53.
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impose a sanction that includes at least one of the potentially conflicting
objectives identified in the legislated list of purposes. Taking into
consideration the objectives of sentencing practices as currently identified
in section 718, the sentencing objectives of victim and community
reparations and recognition of harm should not be ignored by judges
because the victim of a crime was a person with a disability. So long as
victim reparation and recognition of harm are recognized within the
CriminalCode as legitimate sentencing objectives, persons with disabilities
should be entitled to the equal application of these objectives, as would any
non-disabledvictim or community. Personswith disabilities should not have
their difference used to justify the commission of an offence, and then have
the resulting harm experienced by the victim and the victim's community
go unrecognized.
An additional element of the disability equality rights argument in
the Latimer context relates to section 718(2) of the CriminalCode. One of
the principles of sentencing according to section 718(2) is that:
(a)

a sentence should be increased orreduced to account for anyreleant aggravatmg
or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence of the offender, and vthout
limiting the foregoing,
i)

evidence that the offence v,as motivated by bias, prejudice or hate
based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religon, ses,
age, mental or physical disability or sewal onentation or any other
similar factor, or

ii)

evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, aburd the
offender's spouse or child,

iii)

eaidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a
position of trust or authonty in relation to the victim ...
shall bh
deemed to be aggraiating circumstances.

Persons with disabilities have not argued in support of an increased
sentence for Robert Latimer in consideration of the aggravating
circumstances relating to his offence-the fact that he killed his daughter
because of her disability and abused his position of trust and authority as
her father and caregiver. However, the idea that the circumstances
associated vth Tracy Latimer's murder could be designated as mitigating
circumstances by the endorsement of a constitutional exemption to existing
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mandatory sentencing provisions, or by the sanctioning of a relatively
minimal and disproportionate sentence in the absence of mandatory
sentencing provisions, represents a serious equality rights concern.
Justifying the imposition of a reduced sentence based upon a discriminatory
understanding of the worth and value of the disabled victim's life
constitutes a violation of the well-established rule that the law should be
applied in accordance with Charter principles.33 Unfortunately, in its
decision in Latimer, the Supreme Court of Canada did not recognize the
significance of these arguments in the development of its reasoning, leaving
persons with disabilities wary about the future.
On 18 January 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada released its
decision in which it dismissed Latimer's appeal against both conviction and
sentence. 34 The decision in Latimer may be considered a qualified success
from a disability rights perspective. The Court did reject Latimer's
arguments that the defence of necessity should have been put to the jury.
It found that there was no air of reality to the three requirements of
necessity, and that therefore the trial judge was correct to remove the
defence from the jury. The Court found that all of the necessary
requirements of the defence-peril or danger, the lack of a reasonable legal
alternative course of action, and proportionality between the harm inflicted
and the harm avoided- were missing in Latimer's case. It assessed Tracy's
circumstances and correctly concluded that she was not in peril, that it was
unreasonable for her father to end Tracy's life rather than minimizing her
pain and helping her to live, and that the harm inflicted in this case was
immeasurably more serious than Tracy's pain. 5 The Court's rejection of
Latimer's arguments relating to the defence of necessity does represent a
success for persons with disabilities.
The Supreme Court's rejection of arguments in support of a
constitutional exemption to the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions
based upon the specific circumstances of the offender and the offence may

33R. v. Salituro, [19911 3 S.C.R. 654; R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986) 2 SC.R.
573;
Snyder v. Montreal Gazette Ltd., [ 198811 S.C.R. 494; R. v. Seaboyer, ( 1991) 2 S.C.R. 577; R. v, Gntenke,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 263; Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [200012 S.C.R. 307.
Latimer,supra note
4.
35
Ibid. at 23-27.
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also be understood to represent a success. The Court did find that the
application of the mandatory minimum sentence in Latimer's case was not
grossly disproportionate given the circumstances of the case and the gravity
of the offence. It concluded that the application of the minimum sentence
in Latimer's case did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and did
not violate his rights under section 12 of the Charter."'The Court also
found that the sentence was consistent with valid penological goals and
sentencing principles.
However, the Supreme Court made no reference to any
consideration of the equality rights of persons with disabilities in its
consideration of Latimer's application for a constitutional exemption. The
Supreme Court's apparent failure to appreciate the significance of the
equality rights concerns for persons with disabilities is problematic, as
persons with disabilities are a distinct group with guaranteed rights to
equality under section 15 of the Charter.The Court made no attempt in
Latimer to question its own assumptions about the experience of disability,
nor to analyze the role that disability plays in the reasoning advanced by
Latimer to justify an exemption from the mandated sentencing provisions.
The Court's disregard of the disability equality rights perspective means
that persons with disabilities virtually disappear from the analysis.' The
Supreme Court has failed repeatedly to recognize the distinct needs and
rights of persons with disabilities in the equality context)' and its decision
in Latimer represents the most recent example of this failure.

36 Ibid. at 42.
37Ibid. at 41-42.
3 The Supreme Court of Canada did consider the issue of disabihtt as it related to Latimcr's

decision to murder his daughter. The Court implied that Tracks disability did not Justif) Latimer's
decision to murder her. The Court implied that TracN's murder vas not jusificd by its conduwn that
"Tracy had a serious disability, but she was not terminally ill." (bi.d. at 12- Ibi:d at 2(ti) H a;.,.r the
Court also characterized Latimer's decision to murder his disabled daughter as constituting onty "an
error in judgment." (Ibid. at 11.)
39 See especially Eaton v. Brant Countm Beard cf Educaton. (1 9 71 1 S CR 241; Urano.:
AN
Canada(Minister of Enplonentand Innqmiration1, [[LZQJ 1 C-R 7e3; B _z:, . BnS.C. imrb:a
(Attorne General), [199313 S.C.R. 519.
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From a disability rights perspective, the Supreme Court's findings
in Latimer relating to the royal prerogative of mercy are also disturbing and
lead one to question the relative value placed on the lives of persons with
disabilities by the Supreme Court. In the context of the executive clemency
issue, the Supreme Court cited its own decision in R v. Sarson4" as follows:
"Where the courts are unable to provide an appropriate remedy in cases
that the executive sees as unjust imprisonment, the executive is permitted
to dispense 'mercy,' and order the release of the offender." 1 The Supreme
Court seems to be implying that Latimer may be a case in which the courts
are unable legally to provide an appropriate remedy. The Court in Latimer
went on to state:
The executive will undoubtedly, if it chooses to consider the matter [of an executive
prerogative in Rober Latimer's case], examine all of the underlying circumstances
surrounding the tragedy of Tracy Latimer that took place on October 24, 1993, some seven
years ago. Since that time Mr. Latimer has undergone two trials and two appeals to the Court
of Appeal of Saskatchewan and this Court, with attendant publicity and consequential agony
for him and his family."

The Supreme Court appears to be pleading Robert Latimer's
application for prerogative mercy. The Court does not specifically refer to
the tragedy of Tracy's death or her murder, suggesting that from the
perspective of the Supreme Court the tragedy of Tracy Latimer is not
limited to her death, but encompasses her entire life. This kind of
reductionist thinking contributes to the discrimination experienced daily by
persons with disabilities. As was argued by DAWN Canada in its factum:
[Tihis Court should not see Tracy Latimer only in terms of her disabilities. Her status as a
human being must be paramount. Her disability cannot be used as a justification for
departing from fundamental constitutional values. She was a person first and that fact must
not be obscured by the detail of her medical circumstance.4 3

40 [19961 2 S.C.R. 223.
41 Latimer,supra note 4 at
42.
42 Ibid. at 43.
43

DAWN CanadaFactumn, supra note
24 at 6.
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The Supreme Court's comments on the potential use of an
executive prerogative are gratuitous; there was no need for it to comment
on this issue whatsoever. By raising the issue of executive clemency as
"worth(y)" of reference~' and framing its comments in a supportive fashion,
the Court essentially endorsed Robert Latimer's application for prerogative
mercy.
The Supreme Court's comments relating to the significance of the
publicity associated with the Latimer case are also of concern. The Court
seems to be implying that the publicity of the defendant's murder of his
disabled child created such agony for Latimer and his family that it justifies
an executive order of prerogative mercy-a justification that is difficult to
appreciate from a disability perspective. Why should publicity concerning
a father's irrefutable murder of his disabled daughter justify an order of
prerogative mercy? If the defendant were innocent, the negative effect of
such publicity would be obvious. However, Latimer is clearly guilty of the
offence with which he was charged and convicted. From a disability
perspective, the Supreme Court's findings about the publicity associated
with Latimer's prosecution and the consequential agony experienced by
him and his family represent an expression of sympathy similar to that
expressed by the media in support of Robert Latimer-a sympathy that is
grounded in discriminatory thinking about persons with disabilities.
The Supreme Court's comments relating to publicity as a
justification for an order of prerogative mercy are also perplexing given that
so much of the publicity in Latimer's case was actually supportive of his
decision to murder Tracy and the imposition of a reduced sentence. In fact,
Latimer himself relied upon the publicity associated with his case as
evidence of the public support for a reduced sentence!' The Supreme
Court's suggestion that Latimer's prosecution and the publicity associated
with it somehow justify an order for prerogative mercy sounds like the
public refrain "he doesn't deserve the mandatory sentence"-the only
reason being, because his victim was disabled. It is difficult to understand
why the Court felt it necessary to comment on the option of an executive
prerogative, and it represents a serious fla.,with the decision as it appears
to cast doubt on the appropriateness of the Court's own remedy.

44 Latiner,supra note 4 at 42-43.
45 DAWtN, Canada Factum.n

upra note 24 at para. 75
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The nature of the trial judge and jury's findings in Latimer's trial,
the Supreme Court's failure to recognize the significance of the disability
equality arguments in its decision-making and its comments relating to an
executive order of prerogative of mercy, as well as the enormous amount
of public support expressed in support of Robert Latimer's defence,46 justify
the concerns of persons with disabilities about the societal value placed on
their lives. Persons with disabilities fear that without the safeguard of
mandatory minimum sentences, their lives would be significantly devalued
through the use of disability as a justification to reduce a sentence following
a conviction in the murder of a disabled victim. If judges and juries are
inclined to support reduced sentences for those convicted of murdering
persons with disabilities, even in the face of mandatory sentencing
provisions, people with disabilities are concerned that without mandatory
sentencing provisions, they will be at even greater risk of the unequal
application of sentencing principles and practices. They are also concerned
that the successful use of discriminatory justifications to reduce sentences
for those found guilty of murdering persons with disabilities will create the
perception that persons with disabilities have lives of diminished value,
which will in turn reinforce the rationalization for treating them
prejudicially.
Women with disabilities bring an additional, alternative, genderbased perspective to the Latimer case and the issue of mandatory minimum
sentences-the perspective of women as caregivers. Women are the
primary caregivers of children in Canada, and the pressures of providing
care to children with disabilities fall predominantly on them. All of the
children with disabilities murdered by their caregivers since the death of
Tracy Latimer, have been killed by their mothers.4

46 Online: The Home Page in Support of Robert Latimer <www.RobertLatimer.com> (date
accessed: 19 January 2001); J. Mahoney, "Most Support Cut in Latimer's Term for Mercy Killing" The
Globe andMail (18 April 2001) A3.
47
Council of Canadianswith Disabilities presentation to the Senate Subcommittee of the Standing
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology updating "Of Life and Death," March 27, 2000;
See also 1. Peritz, "Shy Girl's Death Called Mercy Killing" The Globe andMail (21 March 2001) A3.
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This fact does not persuade women with disabilities to support the
abolition of mandatory minimum sentences so that mothers may murder
their children with disabilities with impunity, or to support sentencing
leniency in situations in which women murder their disabled children.
Instead, recognizing that women assume a disproportionate share of the
caregiver responsibilities for children with disabilities, and that they often
receive insufficient assistance to cope with these responsibilities, women
with disabilities support increased state assistance for the care of children
with disabilities. A gendered perspective on the care-giving issue provides
women with disabilities an increased appreciation of the complexities
associated with mandatory minimum sentences and of the need to proceed
cautiously with respect to the development of recommendations for
sentencing reform.
IV. WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES AND THE FUTURE OF
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING
In her article, Nitya Iyer Duclos wrote about racial minoritywomen
falling between the cracks of discrimination analyses, and their
disappearance as a distinct group as a result of this experience. 3 Women
with disabilities are also at risk of falling between the cracks of equality
rights analyses. The needs and rights of women with disabilities are often
very different from those of able-bodied women, and litigation and law
reform analyses developed by able-bodied feminists may not reflect the
concerns of women with disabilities. Similarly, the needs and rights of
women with disabilities often differ from those of the mainstream, maledominated disabled community. The issue of mandatory minimum
sentences provides a classic example of the unique perspective that women
with disabilities bring to an analysis of the law. Because of their unique
perspective on an issue such as mandatory minimum sentencing, women
with disabilities cannot be assumed to be represented by positions
developed by able-bodied feminists or by the disabled male community.

4S N. Duelos, "Disappearing Women: Racial Minort \Vomen i Human Rsghts Cascr!
(l93)
6 CJ.AV.L 25.
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The unique concerns and priorities of women with disabilities must be
addressed and recognized in order to ensure that their equality rights are
protected.
There is no easy way to reconcile the many different concerns of
women with disabilities about the issue of mandatory minimum sentences.
It is now well known that the experience of multiple grounds of
discrimination is not an additive experience 4 --women with disabilities are
not women and disabled, or persons with disabilities and women. As the
issue of mandatory minimum sentences demonstrates, women with
disabilities are unique in their experience. Therefore they cannot just accept
the position on mandatory minimum sentences as adopted by many ablebodied feminist organizations in Canada, such as the abolition of
mandatory minimum sentences, even on the condition of the introduction
of sentencing "guidelines" designed to protect the interests of
disadvantaged groups. The experience of women with disabilities is that
when discretion is left in the hands of the judiciary, they are vulnerable to
the discriminatory exercise of that discretion. Nor can women with
disabilities accept that mandatory minimum sentences should be
maintained in light of their unequal application and the systemically
discriminatory effect of mandatory minimum sentences on women, persons
with disabilities, members of racialized communities, the poor, and other
disadvantaged groups.
The introduction of some kind of sentencing mechanism designed
to ensure that sentencing discretion is exercised in accordance with Charter
values so as to protect the equality rights of all persons, including persons
with disabilities, represents a possible answer to the dilemma faced by
women with disabilities in the mandatory minimum context. The legislative
introduction of such a mechanism would alleviate the primary concern with
the abolition of mandatory minimum sentences, and would likely facilitate
a movement in support of its abolition. As part of a general commitment
towards developing a more equitable justice system, women with disabilities
are committed to the development and introduction of a sentencing
mechanism that will ensure the protection of their equality and security

49 See A. Lorde, "Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference" in Sister
Outsider
(Freedom: The Crossing Press Feminist Series, 1984) 114 at 120; A.P. Harris, "Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory" (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 at 588-89; C. Weedon,Feninisin, Theoiy andthe
PoliticsofDifference (Malden: Blackwell, 1999).
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rights so that they can then endorse the abolition of mandatory minimum
sentencing without reservation. This goal is critical to women with
disabilities as they seek to ensure that the creation of a more equitable
justice system is a process from which they do not disappear and to which
they contribute.

